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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. PARENT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent

Case
No. 12033

BRIEF 0'F RESP·ONDENT.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Second
Judicial District, Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, Judge, presiding, denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a full hearing, the Honorable Parley E. Norseth ordered the denial of the appellant's petition for
writ of habeas corpus and remanded the appellant to
the custody of the respondent.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 18, 1969, appellant pleaded guilty to a
charge of assault with a deadly weapon before the Honorable Parley E. Norseth in the Second Judicial District
in and for Weber County, State of Utah (R-78). At this
arraignment hearing, appellant was advised by the judge
of his rights, including his right to appointed counsel.
Appellant waived his rights (R-8) and was thereafter
sentenced to a term of zero to five years in the State
Penitentiary (R-9).
On January 29, 1970, appellant filed a writ of
habeas corpus with the Utah Supreme Court (R-3). On
February 16, 1970, the hearing on the writ was held
before the District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, Judge, presiding. At this hearing, appellant was represented by court-appointed counsel (R-15). The District Court denied the writ.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, AND
INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT THE PRELIMINARY AND ARRAIGNMENT
HEARINGS.

This Court has held that a defendant must be informed of his right to counsel at every stage of the pro2

ceedings, and that a waiver of such right must be made
intelligently and knowingly. State v. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d
14, 361 P.2d 509 (1961).
In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), the
United States Supreme Court stated that in order for the
waiver to be effective, "the record must show, or there
must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer." 369 U.S. at 516.
The minute entry shows that at the preliminary
hearing appellant was offered counsel but intelligently
and knowingly rejected the offer:
"The Court informed the defendant of his
legal right to a preliminary examination and to
the aid of counsel at every stage of the proceedings against him, and he is asked by the Court if
he desires the aid of counsel, to which he answered
that he does not." (R-31)
The record demonstrates that after appellant stated
at the arraignment that he understood what he was doing
when he waived his rights at the preliminary hearing
(R-33), he was offered counsel at the arraignment but
intelligently and understandingly refused the offer:
"The Court: Do you want a lawyer?
"Mr. Parent: No, I don't.
"The Court: Now, this is a felony charge,
and carries with it a penitentiary sentence.
"Mr. Parent: Yes, your Honor.
"The Court: Now you know that you are
entitled to a trial by jury?
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"Mr. Parent: (Nods head.)
"The Court: You don't have to waive any
of those rights.
"Mr. Parent: Right." (R-34)
The record clearly manifests that not only was appellant offered counsel, but that he was also advised
that he did not have to waive his right to counsel.
Such an enumeration by the trial judge of defendant's
right of counsel coupled with the defendant's rejection,
as presented by the record, constitutes an effective waiver
is demonstrated by Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155
(1957). Here the Court held that a waiver of the right
of counsel was made intelligently and understandingly
where the reviewing Circuit Court found as a matter of
fact that the trial judge asked the defendant "whether
he had a lawyer and whether he desired to have a lawyer,
and that [the petitioner] gave a negative reply to both of
the inquiries." 355 U.S. at 158.
Even though the record shows that appellant was
offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer, appellant contends that because the trial
judge did not specifically tell him that he would appoint an attorney if he could not afford to hire one,
appellant's waiver was not effective. (Appellant's Brief
at 14). The transcript of the hearing on the writ, however, plainly demonstrates that at the arraignment appellant was fully aware that counsel would be appointed
for him if he could not afford one:
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"Q. All right. So you knew that if you
couldn't afford counsel, one would be appointed?
"A. Right. I figured it would be appointed
in here." (R-12-13)
This Court has held that where the record demonstrates that the petitioner had expressly declined an offer
of counsel by the trial court, the petitioner must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that his acquiescense
was not given with the sufficient understanding and intelligence necessary for a valid waiver. Maxwell v.
Turner, 20 Utah 2d 163, 453 P.2d 287 (1967). See
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 ( 1962).
The above-quoted testimony at the hearing on
the writ, and the other statements by appellant at
his arraignment (R-34), show that appellant obviously
knew at the time of both the preliminary and arraignment that counsel would be appointed if he could not
afford it. Appellant contends that he did not know that
the Court would have appointed counsel if he could not
accorded it. The only evidence offered by appellant to
uphold this contention is a statement made by appellant
at the hearing on the writ to the effect that if the trial
judge had told him that counsel would be appointed even
if he could not afford it, he would have asked for counsel. (Appellant's Brief at 7).
Plainly such a self-serving statement, completely at
odds with his previous statements and testimony, does
not meet the preponderance of evidence test of Maxwell,
supra. See Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d
968, 970, footnote 7 (1968).
5

The Court has stated that on appeal the record is
surveyed in a light most favorable to the findings and
judgment of the lower court, and it will not reverse if
there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial
court's decision. Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 443
P.2d 1020 (1968). State v. Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215,
418 P.2d 780 (1966).
Respondent submits that there is clearly reasonable
basis in the record to support the trial court's decision
that it went far beyond the ordinary procedure to impress upon appellant his rights (R-37); that at the time
appellant entered his plea of guilty he understood very
thoroughly each and all of his rights (R-36); and that
appellant waived each and all of those rights. (R-36)
POINT II.
THE VON MOLTKE GUIDELINES DO NOT GOVERN THE DISPOSITION OF THIS APPEAL.

Although appellant was informed at the arraignment by the trial court that he was charged with a felony
that carried a penitentiary sentence, and although appellant was there also informed of his rights of counsel,
jury trial, and self-incrimination, which rights appellant waived (R-34), appellant asserts that his waiver of
right to counsel was not effective because the trial court
failed to inform him of the so-called Von Moltke standards. (Appellant's Brief at 13). Appellant contends that
the asserted standards of Von Moltke require a trial
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judge to inform the defendant of the range of statutory
offenses included within the charge; the range of allowable punishments for such offenses, possible defenses,
and mitigating circumstances. (Appellant's Brief at 12)
Respondent would submit that not only do the asserted standards not apply to the effectiveness of waiver
of right to counsel in state proceedings, but also that
the asserted standards are mere guidelines, not constitutional mandates upon the federal and state courts.

Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948), enumerated the responsibilities of federal trial judges, in cases
of federal offenses, to insure that a waiver of counsel was
understandingly and intelligently made. 332 U.S. at 723.
Von Moltke was decided prior to the Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), decision that expanded the
right of counsel to include trial courts in state proceedings.
While the Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938),
principle that the determination of whether there has
been an effective waiver of the right to counsel depends
upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case
has been made applicable to waiver of right of counsel
in state criminal proceedings, Carnley v. Cochran, 396
U.S. 506, 515 (1962); and while the Cochran principle that
the record must show, or an allegation and evidence which
show, that the accused was offered counsel by intelligently
and understandingly rejected the offer has been made applicable to state criminal proceedings, Cochran, 369 U.S.
at 516. The Supreme Court has not even intimated that
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the guidelines stated in Von Moltke are constitutional
principles applicable to state proceedings. Indeed, there
is no subsequent case in which the Court has even applied
the Von Moltke guidelines to federal waiver of counsel.
The Von Moltke guidelines and federal decisions
thereunder were reviewed in Spanbauer v. Burke, 374
F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1966). The study concluded that such
application as there has been of Von Moltke to state proceedings have not relied upon the literal language or application of the Von Moltke standards, but upon the proposition that the state trial judge has a duty to make an
investigation into the circumstances to determine whether
the petitioner has intelligently and competently waived
his right to counsel. 374 F.2d at 71.
Another federal decision, White v. Burke, 281 F.
Supp. 300 (W.D. Wis. 1968) which carefully analyzed
the applicability of Von Moltke to state criminal proceedings, stated that the Von Moltke duties were not constitutional staples to be strictly applied, but rather that they
were merely suggested guidelines for the trial judges. 281
F. Supp. at 302.
As shown under respondent's first point, Judge Norseth, both at the arraignment and at the hearing on the
writ, adequately investigated into the facts and circumstances of appellant's waiver to determine if it was made
intelligently and understandingly.
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CONCLUSION
Since the record clearly indicates a knowing, intelligent waiver, respondent asks the decision of the District
Court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Repondent
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